The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) from coded storage systems with colluding, Byzantine, and unresponsive servers is considered. An explicit scheme using an [n, k] Reed-Solomon storage code is designed, protecting against t-collusion, and handling up to b Byzantine and r unresponsive servers, when n > k + t + 2b + r − 1. This scheme achieves a PIR rate of ((n − r − (k + 2b + t − 1))/n − r). In the case where the capacity is known, namely, when k = 1, it is asymptotically capacity achieving as the number of files grows. Finally, the scheme is adapted to symmetric PIR.
I. INTRODUCTION
P RIVATE Information Retrieval (PIR) is concerned with designing schemes for a user to retrieve a certain file from a storage system without revealing the identity of the file to the servers. This problem was introduced by Chor et al. [2] , where the database was viewed as an M-bit binary string x = [x 1 · · · x M ] ∈ {0, 1} M from which the user wants to retrieve one bit x i while keeping the index i hidden from the server. In this work, we consider files encoded and stored on n servers, and assume that the user wants to retrieve some file x i from the storage system, without revealing the index i . We assume a system with t-collusion, wherein any t of the n servers may collude in an attempt to deduce the desired file index. We additionally assume the presence of b Byzantine servers, which return erroneous information, and r unresponsive servers, which do not return any information at all.
The download rate, PIR rate, or simply rate of a PIR scheme in this model is measured as the ratio of the size of the downloaded file to the total amount of downloaded data; upload costs of the requests are ignored. As with the large majority of information-theoretic work on PIR, the rate will be our primary metric for judging the efficiency of a PIR scheme.
Initially, PIR constructions served to reduce the total download cost from a storage system with data replicated on multiple servers [3] - [8] . More recently, PIR schemes were constructed on coded data. Shah et al. [9] show that downloading one extra bit is enough to achieve privacy, if the number of servers is exponential in the number of files. Chan et al. [10] derive bounds on the tradeoff between storage cost and download cost for linearly coded data. The optimal upper bounds on PIR rate for maximum distance separable (MDS) coded data were derived in [11] . PIR schemes for MDS coded storage that achieve the asymptotic optimal download cost for specific numbers of colluding servers were presented in [12] . For the case of any number of colluding servers, Freij-Hollanti et al. [13] constructed a new family of PIR schemes on Reed-Solomon (RS) coded data achieving a lower download cost than the ones in [12] . PIR schemes on arbitrary linear storage codes were constructed in [14] . The notion of symmetric PIR, where the user is allowed to gain no information about the non-requested files, was studied in [15] and [16] .
In [8] , it is shown that the asymptotic PIR capacity for replicated data, as the number of files M → ∞, for a fixed number of colluding servers t, is n−t n , where n is the number of nodes. When the data is coded using an [n, k] MDS code, it was shown in [11] that the asymptotic capacity is n−k n . Codes achieving this PIR rate were first presented in [12] .
The problem of constructing PIR schemes on replicated data in which some servers can be Byzantine (malicious) was considered in [17] - [19] . The asymptotic capacity of PIR on replicated storage systems with t colluding servers and b Byzantine servers was found in [20] to be n−(2b+t ) n . Wang and Skoglund [21] investigate the problem of providing 0018-9448 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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symmetric PIR from a replicated system with colluding servers and adversaries in the system. A PIR scheme on coded data with colluding and either Byzantine or unresponsive servers was constructed in [22] . PIR from unsynchronized servers was studied in [23] . In this model, the files are stored on multiple servers and some servers might not be updated to the latest version. An adaptive PIR scheme is constructed for the user to privately retrieve the file they require. The setting of unsynchronized servers in [23] is similar to the Byzantine servers since in both cases some servers are giving erroneous responds. Compared to the present paper, the work in [23] is more restrictive and uses an adaptive scheme.
Main Contributions: In this paper, we construct a PIR scheme with servers storing data coded using a Reed-Solomon code, with up to t colluding servers, b Byzantine servers, and r unresponsive servers. We improve the PIR rate from [1] in the case where k does not divide n − 2b − r − t + 1. Provided that n > k + t + 2b + r − 1, our scheme achieves a PIR rate of
Specializing to the case of r = b = 0, we achieve a rate n−(k+t −1) n , which coincides with the rate achieved in [13] . Finally, the scheme is adapted to symmetric PIR, where the rate is optimal in the known cases in terms of achieving the bounds given in [15] , [16] , and [21] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Basic Definitions
We consider a storage system with n servers storing M files f 1 , . . . , f M , where each file is a matrix of size L × k over a finite field F. We refer to L as the number of stripes in the file.
Each file f i is encoded using an [n, k] linear code C over F in the following way. Let G C ∈ F k×n be a generator matrix of C. Then the encoded file y i is given by y i = f i · G C , a matrix of size L × n. The encoded files are distributed across the n servers by defining ⎛
The vector y j is then stored on server j , for j = 1, . . . , n. The PIR problem for the above encoded storage system can be described as follows. A user wishes to download a file f i without revealing the index i to any server. To do this, the user generates, according to some distribution, queries q j : F L M → F S for some S, and sends q j to server j . Considering schemes for which S > 1 is necessary so that the total file size is divisible by the amount of data that can be privately retrieved with a single query. The server responds with the value r j = q j (y j ), and the desired file f i can be computed as a deterministic function of the set r j , j = 1, . . . , n.
In line with previous work on PIR, we refer to each of the S coordinate functions q (s) j of the query q j = q (1) j , . . . , q (S) j as a subquery, which takes place during a single round or iteration of the scheme. Thus, during the s th round, the user sends the function q (s) j : F L M → F to server j , who responds with r
During each round, we assume the presence of b Byzantine servers, who will instead respond with an arbitrary element of F, as well as the presence of r unresponsive servers, whose responses are replaced with an erasure symbol ?. The erasure symbol ? is absorbing with respect to addition, in the sense that ? + x =? for all x ∈ F. The identities of the servers which are Byzantine and unresponsive is allowed to change from round to round. During round s, we can write the total response vector as
where ε is a vector containing at most r erasure symbols and at most b non-zero elements of F. A PIR scheme as described above protects against t-collusion, or is t-private, if for every subset T = { j 1 , . . . , j T } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of servers of size |T | = t, we have
Our principal metric of efficiency of a PIR scheme is the download rate, or simply rate, defined as
which is the ratio of the size of the desired file to the amount of total downloaded data. We assume that exactly r of the servers are unresponsive during each round of the scheme, hence the number of downloaded symbols in total in one round will be n − r .
B. Reed-Solomon Codes
From now on, we assume that |F| ≥ n. Let α 1 , . . . , α n be n distinct elements of F. Let k ≤ n and consider the space F[z] <k of all single-variable polynomials of degree < k. We define an evaluation map
We denote the inverse of eval on RS[n, k] by dec, which performs polynomial interpolation to recover f (z) from the vector of evaluations:
The maps eval and dec are vector space isomorphisms between RS[n, k] and F[z] <k .
C. Storage Systems From Reed-Solomon Codes
We will consider storage codes C which are Reed-Solomon codes: C = RS [n, k] . Given a file f i , the k information symbols of row f i, are encoded as coefficients of a polynomial
of degree < k. This polynomial is evaluated at n different points α 1 , · · · , α n ∈ F, and the evaluations of these polynomials at α j are stored on server j . Therefore, the matrix
and the contents y j of server j are the length L M column vector
We remark that all schemes presented in this work can be used for storage systems using generalized Reed-Solomon codes as well, but we restrict the description to RS codes for simplicity.
NOMENCLATURE n
Number 
A. A Simple Example
We start with an example which shows how the scheme works. In the following subsection we will describe the scheme in its full generality, but the present example suffices to convey the basic ideas.
Example 1: Suppose we have a system with parameters n = 9, k = 4, t = b = r = 1. Our storage code C is an [9, 4] Reed-Solomon code. Let α be the evaluation vector of the Reed-Solomon code. To correct the errors and erasures, we require that the responses live in a code with a minimum distance of at least 2b + r + 1 = 4, and thus can tolerate b errors and r erasures. Among the n = 9 total dimensions of a single response, k + t − 1 are spanned by randomness Fig. 1 . Divisions for Example 1. The file f i is split into two parts h i, (1) and h i, (2) , which are retrieved in rounds 1 and 2, respectively. required to preserve privacy and introduced by the storage code. Additionally, 2b + r dimensions are required to perform erasure and error correction. This forces us to use no more than the remaining ρ := n − (k + t + 2b +r − 1) dimensions to retrieve information. Our files will have L = 1 row and our scheme will require S = 2 rounds.
Suppose that we want to download f i . Based on the above discussion, in each round we will recover exactly ρ = 2 symbols of file f i . We see that in this example f i only has one row, hence Figure 1 . In round s of the scheme we will retrieve the coefficients of h i,(s) (z), which comprise ρ symbols of the desired file, see Figure 2 .
In round 1 we choose a random coefficient/constant polynomial d m, (1) for every file f m , 1 ≤ m ≤ M. For the requested file f i we add the monomial z 2 to d i, (1) . In other words, define q (1) 
where q m, (1) 
and the query q j sent to the j th server is given by
Before the addition of errors and erasures induced by the Byzantine and unresponsive servers, the response from server j is
The vector r (1) 
n ) consisting of all of the responses from the n servers is therefore
where r (1) Since deg(r (1) (z)) ≤ 5, we see that r (1) is an element of a Reed-Solomon code with parameters [9, 6] with minimum distance 4, and can thus tolerate the one error and one erasure introduced by the Byzantine and unresponsive servers.
Expanding the polynomial r (1) (z), we have r (1) 
Since deg(g(z)) ≤ 3, we have that eval(g(z)) ∈ C. Therefore, we can recover the coefficients of h i,1 (z), namely f i 1,2 and f i 1,3 , from the response vector r (1) .
In round 2, we again sample M constant polynomials d m, (2) and set q (2) 
where q m, (2) 
A similar calculation as in the first round shows that the total response vector r (2) in the second round, before the addition of errors and erasures, is r (2) = eval(r (2) (z)), where r (2) 
The user receives eval(r (2) (z)) plus a vector consisting of errors and erasures. From round 1, the user knows h i,(1) (z), and before correcting for errors and erasures can subtract eval(h i,(1) (z)z 6 ) from what they receive. What is left is a codeword of a Reed-Solomon code which can correct the errors and erasures as in round 1. Again as in round 1, the user reads off the coefficients of h i, (2) (z), namely f i 1,0 and f i 1,1 . The user now has all of the coefficients of f i and can reconstruct the entire file. The rate of this scheme is clearly seen to be
B. The General Scheme
Let ρ := n − (k + t + 2b +r − 1). We choose the parameters L and S to be minimal such that Lk = Sρ, that is,
Our scheme requires that
and the rate of our scheme will be given by
in other words, ρ is the number of symbols retrieved during each round of the protocol. To correct the b errors and r erasures from the Byzantine and unresponsive servers, our scheme will be constructed so that the response vector r (s) during round s is an element of an affine shift of a Reed-Solomon code with minimum distance d = 2b + r + 1. The vector by which the Reed-Solomon code is shifted is known to the user during each round, allowing one to correct for the b errors and r erasures.
For every round s, we choose i.i.d. uniform codewords from the query code D = RS[n, t], as the evaluation of polynomials d m,(s) (z), for every row of every file m. For the rows of file i we add the evaluation of another polynomial to the query, such that all ρ coefficients of a polynomial h i,(s) (z) (defined formally in eq. (24)) can be retrieved in round s, as represented in Figure 3 . Explicitly, we let
and add the evaluation of 
Note that deg(q m,(s) (z) at z = α j . In round s, before the addition of the errors and erasures due to the Byzantine and unresponsive servers, the response r (s) j from server j is given by r
Note that sρ − k + k + t − 1 ≥ t ⇔ ≤ sρ/k, therefore the above is equal to
The second summand in the above illustrates that during round s, the response involves rows 1, . . . , sρ/k. The total response vector (before the addition of errors and erasures) during round s is therefore
We will refer to r (s) (z) as the response polynomial during round s.
To best illustrate why we can recover ρ information symbols from the above response, we first consider what happens in round s = 1. The response polynomial during round 1 is
= g (1) 
Expressing the last summand as two terms, one of which has degree < k + t − 1, and one which has degree ≥ k + t − 1 yields = g (1) 
where h i, (1) 
From (20) we see that deg(r (1) 
is a codeword in a Reed-Solomon code with minimum distance 2b + r + 1. Hence the user can correct up to b errors and r erasures introduced by the Byzantine and unresponsive servers. After correcting errors and erasures, the user obtains from the above expression the k coefficients of the polynomials f i (z) for = 1, . . . , ρ/k − 1, and when = ρ/k, we obtain from the polynomial f i ρ/k (z) the coefficients f i ρ/k,κ for κ = ρ/kk − ρ, . . . , k − 1. Thus ρ information symbols are downloaded in the first round. Now consider round s. We define polynomials h i,(s) (z) of degree < ρ by the following recursive formula. The polynomial h i, (1) (z) is defined as in (23), and for s > 1 we define them recursively via the formula
where deg(g (s) (z)) < k + t − 1. Note that the h i,(s) (z) depend only on the file f i and not the randomness present in the queries. Picking off the polynomials whose coefficients we know from previous rounds, we can write
The user receives eval(r (s) (z)) plus errors and erasures. First subtracting off the evaluation of the known summands in the above, we arrive at a codeword in the same Reed-Solomon code as in round 1, which allows us to correct errors and erasures. The user then recovers the ρ coefficients of the polynomial h i,(s) (z).
To prove that this suffices to download the whole file, consider the response polynomial r (S) (z) in round S. Equating the expressions (19) and (24) for r (S) (z), we arrive at the equality
which shows that the h i,(s) (z) determine the polynomials f i (z) completely, as depicted in Fig. 4 .
The achieved rate by this scheme is easily seen to be
The scheme is t-private since the retrieval code D is MDS of dimension t, the proof is identical to the proof of privacy in [13] .
In order to illustrate some of the subtleties that appear in the scheme construction for more general sets of parameters, we present the following example. This serves to illustrate how the scheme works when we require L > 1 rows, S > 1 rounds, and t > 1 colluding servers. Moreover, note that for the given parameters we have ρ > k, which forces us to retrieve coefficients from more than one polynomial f i, (z) at a time.
Example 2: Suppose we have the parameters n = 14, k = 4, t = 2, r = 1, b = 1. We construct a scheme that achieves a PIR rate of 6/13. We can retrieve ρ = 6 symbols per round, and require L = 3 rows per file and S = 2 rounds of the scheme. Thus, we decompose the file in two ways as
as shown in Figure 5 . We pick the retrieval code D = RS [14, 2] . In round s = 1, we sample i.i.d. uniform codewords eval(d m, (1) (z)) ∈ D. The query polynomials q i, (1) (z) are given by q i, (1) 
The response polynomial r (1) (z) is of the form r (1) where deg(g (1) (z)) < k + t − 1 = 5, which allows us to download the four coefficients of f i 1 (z) plus the two additional coefficients of f i 2 (z). In round two, the response polynomial r (2) (z) is of the form r (2) 
known from first round from which we obtain the coefficients of h i,(2) (z), as shown in Figure 6 .
IV. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS PIR SCHEMES AND A SYMMETRIC VARIANT A. Comparison With Other Work on PIR With Byzantine and Unresponsive Servers and Coded Data
Recently, Zhang and Ge [22] constructed a PIR scheme for coded data and colluding servers, which is adaptable for unresponsive and Byzantine servers (but not for both simultaneously). In this section we briefly compare the rates obtained in this paper with those of [22] in the asymptotic regime as M → ∞. The scheme of [22] only achieves positive rates assuming certain inequalities in the basic system parameters are satisfied, namely the obvious inequalities which guarantee that the expressions below in (27) and (28) are positive. To compare the two schemes at their best, we grant this assumption.
When b = 0 and r > 0, the asymptotic rate as M → ∞ from [22] can be expressed as
An elementary calculation shows thatR < n−r−(k+t −1) n−r , the rate obtained for the scheme described in the Fig. 7 . The PIR rate versus number of files M when n = 12, k = 2, and t = 3 following the scheme in [22] and the scheme in this paper. previous sections. In the case where b > 0 and r = 0, the asymptotic rate obtained in [22] is
which, again by a simple argument, is less than n−(k+t +2b−1) n , the rate obtained by the proposed scheme in this case.
Lastly, we remark that the rates obtained in [22] decrease with an increasing number of files, while the rates we obtain are constant in the number of files. As noted in [22] , the rates therein outperform those of [13] for a small number of files. We can see from Figure 7 that the same holds here for these example parameters.
B. A Symmetric Variant
A PIR scheme is symmetric if the user, while retrieving the requested file f i , gains no information about any of the other files f i for i = i . To construct a symmetric variant of our scheme, we assume the servers have access to a joint source of randomness. Each round, the joint source of randomness outputs a uniform random codeword π (s) = eval(π (s) (z)), where π (s) 
The scheme proceeds exactly as before, though all servers compute r (s) j = q (s) j , y j + π (s) j , which the responsive, non-Byzantine servers transmit back to the user. As before, the user receives an erasure symbol from the unresponsive servers, and an arbitrary element of F from the Byzantine servers. Since deg(π (s) (z)) < k + t − 1, it is absorbed into the 'randomness' term g (s) (z) and therefore does not affect how the user recovers the ρ information symbols. Since π (s) (z) is uniformly chosen, there is clearly no information leaked about any files f i for i = i .
We note that this is the same amount of randomness needed to symmetrize the scheme of [15] , which deals with the case of b = r = 0, as well as in the scheme of [21] , which deals with the case k = 1.
C. Conjectures
We venture the following conjectures regarding the asymptotic and symmetric capacities of this PIR problem.
Conjecture 1: The asymptotic capacity (as M → ∞) of Private Information Retrieval for an [n, k] MDS storage code with t-collusion, b Byzantine servers, and r unresponsive servers is n−r−(k+t +2b−1) n−r . That is, the current scheme is asymptotically capacity-achieving.
Conjecture 2: The capacity of Symmetric Private Information Retrieval for an [n, k] MDS storage code with t-collusion, b Byzantine servers, and r unresponsive servers is n−r−(k+t +2b−1) n−r . That is, the symmetrization of the current scheme is capacity-achieving. Furthermore, to guarantee symmetry, the minimum entropy per round required for the shared randomness amongst the servers is k + t − 1 (in q-ary units).
V. CONCLUSION
A PIR scheme was presented in this paper which can simultaneously handle coded data and colluding, unresponsive servers, and Byzantine servers. In the current work, the response from the servers is an element of a linear code which allows the user to correct for the erasures and errors produced by the unresponsive and Byzantine servers. The scheme has rate n−r−(k+2b+t −1) n−r , which is equal to the asymptotic capacity (as the number of files goes to infinity) in all cases where the capacity is known. The scheme compares favorably to previous schemes which account for unresponsive and Byzantine servers. Additionally, the scheme is easily symmetrizable. 
